課程資訊
課程名稱
商業賽局模型二
Game Theory with Applications to Marketing and Finance (Ⅱ) 
開課學期
109-2 
授課對象
管理學院  財務金融學研究所  
授課教師
陳其美 
課號
Fin7036 
課程識別碼
723 M6520 
班次
 
學分
3.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期四A,B,C(18:25~21:05) 
上課地點
管一203 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。
限學士班二年級以上
總人數上限:40人 
 
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課程概述

This course is a sequel to the course Game Theory with Applications to
Finance and Marketing, I, and it will review the major ingredients of contract
theory. The intended audiences are graduate students who have taken Game
Theory with Applications to Finance and Marketing, I or some graduatelevel
game theory course, and who are interested in applying game theory
to contract and institution design in the fields of finnance and/or marketing.
We shall selectively cover some topics in the two books below:
1. Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, 2002, The Theory of Incentives,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
2. Oliver Hart, 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, London:
Oxford University Press.
We shall cover chapters 2,3,4,8,and 9 in Laffont and Martimort (2002)
and several chapters of Hart (1995). The following is an overview of the
materials in Laffont and Martimort (2002) to be covered in this course.
1. Chapters 2 and 3 cover static adverse selection problem. Chapter 2
lays out the basic problem with the informed agent having two types.
It proves the revelation principle and applies it to various problems
in section 2.15. It emphasizes the different roles of ex-ante and expost
participation constraints, and briefly considers random schemes.
Chapter 3 considers an informed agent with more than 2 types, with
multi-dimensional private information, or with type-dependent or random
participation constraint. The materials there are then applied to the costly state verification (CSV) financial contracting problem.
2. Chapter 4 considers the static moral hazard problem. Chapter 4 considers
an agent who is either risk averse or is risk neutral but protected
by limited liability. In this chapter, the agent has two effort choices,
and is delegated with a single task. The theory has various applications
in section 4.8, and it is related to the theory of the firm.
3. Chapter 8 considers repeated adverse selection.
4. Chapter 9 considers incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem.
There will be homework assignments due regularly, which together with an inclass
midterm and oral presentation (of an assigned paper in either finance or
marketing) determine a student’s grade. The following is a tentative schedule.
Week no. Contents
1 Chapter 2 of LM
2 Chapter 2 of LM continued
3 Chapter 3 of LM
4 Chapter 3 of LM continued
5 Chapter 4 of LM
6 Chapter 4 of LM continued
7 Chapter 8 of LM
8 Chapter 8 of LM continued
9 Chapter 9 of LM continued
10 Midterm Examination
11-16 Hart’s Book
17-18 Oral Presentation 

課程目標
 
課程要求
 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
指定閱讀
 
參考書目
 
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